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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2516 
___________ 
 
In re:  THE TRUSTEES OF CONNEAUT  
LAKE PARK, INC., 
          
   Debtor 
 
 
PARK RESTORATION, LLC 
 
v. 
 
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE; 
THE TRUSTEES OF CONNEAUT LAKE PARK, a 
charitable trust; CRAWFORD COUNTY, a political 
subdivision; SUMMIT TOWNSHIP, a municipal corporation; 
TAX CLAIM BUREAU OF CRAWFORD COUNTY; 
CONNEAUT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 
SUMMIT TOWNSHIP, a municipal corporation;  
CRAWFORD COUNTY, a political subdivision; 
THE TAX CLAIM BUREAU OF CRAWFORD COUNTY; 
THE CONNEAUT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
          
Appellants 
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__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-16-cv-00006) 
District Judge: Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein 
___________ 
 
Argued January 18, 2017 
Before: FISHER*, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  May 2, 2017) 
 
John F. Mizner  [Argued] 
Mizner Law Firm  
311 West Sixth Street  
Erie, PA 16507  
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
Lawrence C. Bolla  
Michael P. Kruszewski  
Arthur D. Martinucci  [Argued] 
Quinn Buseck Leemhuis Toohey & Kroto  
2222 West Grandview Boulevard 
Erie, PA 16506  
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
                                                 
* Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit 
Judge for the Third Circuit, assumed senior status on 
February 1, 2017. 
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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Pennsylvania law prohibits insurance companies from 
paying fire insurance proceeds to a “named insured” unless 
the local municipality certifies that no delinquent taxes are 
owed on the property where the insured structure was located. 
40 Pa. Stat. § 638. The District Court held that “named 
insured” as used in Section 638 includes only those who own 
the structure at issue and are responsible for the delinquent 
taxes. Because the Bankruptcy Court rightly held that this 
interpretation contravenes the text of the statute, we will 
reverse.  
I 
This appeal involves Conneaut Lake Park, which abuts 
Conneaut Lake in Crawford County, Pennsylvania. The Park 
included a historic venue known as the Beach Club, which 
was owned by the Trustees of Conneaut Lake Park, Inc. 
Appellant Park Restoration, LLC, operated the Beach Club 
under a management agreement with the Trustees. Park 
Restoration insured the Beach Club against fire loss for 
$611,000 through Erie Insurance Exchange. When the Beach 
Club was destroyed by fire in 2013, Park Restoration 
submitted a claim to Erie. Erie did not dispute the claim, but 
in accordance with 40 Pa. Stat § 638, it required Park 
Restoration to obtain a certificate from the local municipal 
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treasurer stating whether back taxes were owed on the 
property. 
Park Restoration received a certificate showing a total 
of $478,260.75 in delinquent property taxes owed by the 
Trustees to Summit Township, Crawford County, the Tax 
Claim Bureau of Crawford County, and Conneaut School 
District (collectively, Taxing Authorities). These delinquent 
taxes dated back to 1996, well before Park Restoration signed 
its management agreement with the Trustees, and the taxes 
were owed on the entire 55.33 acre parcel on Conneaut Lake, 
not just the single acre that included the Beach Club. 
Nonetheless, because of the tax delinquency, Erie notified 
Park Restoration that it would transfer to the Taxing 
Authorities $478,260.75 of the $611,000 insurance proceeds. 
Park Restoration objected, prompting Erie to interplead the 
proceeds in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County. 
The interpleader action was transferred to the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania after the Trustees filed for bankruptcy. In the 
Bankruptcy Court, Park Restoration argued that Section 638 
“applies solely to those situations where the fee owner of the 
property is insured and where the tax liabilities at issue are 
the financial responsibility of the owner as well.” In re 
Trustees of Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 543 B.R. 193, 198 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015). Park Restoration argued that any 
other construction would violate the Takings Clauses of the 
United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. 
The Trustees responded that Park Restoration was not entitled 
to any of the insurance proceeds because Park Restoration 
insured the Trustees’ property. Therefore, the Trustees sought 
the remaining insurance proceeds after the Taxing Authorities 
were compensated. 
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The Taxing Authorities and Park Restoration filed 
cross motions for summary judgment. The Bankruptcy Court 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of both parties. It 
held that under Section 638 the Taxing Authorities were 
entitled to full payment of the delinquent taxes ($478,260.75), 
and that Park Restoration, as the named insured, was entitled 
to the balance of the insurance proceeds. 
Park Restoration and the Trustees filed cross-appeals 
to the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. Park Restoration argued, for the first time, that 
because the insured property constituted only 9% of the tax 
value of the parcel, Park Restoration’s insurance proceeds 
should apply pro rata to the tax debt. It also argued that 
anything more would be an unconstitutional taking. 
Meanwhile, the Trustees claimed entitlement to the balance of 
the insurance proceeds because they owned the Beach Club.  
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
summary judgment for Park Restoration as against the 
Trustees, but reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s summary 
judgment for the Taxing Authorities as against Park 
Restoration. The Court held that Section 638 is ambiguous 
because it uses “named insured” and “insured property 
owner” interchangeably. In re Trustees of Conneaut Lake 
Park, Inc., 551 B.R. 577, 584–85 (W.D. Pa. 2016). The 
District Court then considered legislative intent and 
concluded that the General Assembly intended Section 638 to 
apply only to property owners. The Court reasoned that 
because Park Restoration did not own the Beach Club or the 
parcel upon which it was located, it was not responsible for 
the Trustees’ delinquent taxes. The Taxing Authorities 
appealed the District Court’s judgment.  
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II 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and 1334(b). The District Court had 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Our 
jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. 
“Because the District Court sat as an appellate court, 
reviewing an order of the Bankruptcy Court, our review of the 
District Court’s determinations is plenary.” In re Wettach, 
811 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Bocchino, 794 
F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2015)).      
III 
The Taxing Authorities argue that the District Court 
erred in reversing the Bankruptcy Court’s order granting them 
summary judgment. We agree. Section 638 required Erie to 
transfer funds from Park Restoration’s insurance claim to the 
Taxing Authorities irrespective of Park Restoration’s property 
interest in the Beach Club. Though Park Restoration’s public 
policy and equitable arguments are not without force, they 
cannot vitiate the statutory language. Additionally, we agree 
with the Bankruptcy Court that Section 638 as applied in this 
case does not violate the Takings Clauses of the United States 
Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution.  
A 
 Although Pennsylvania courts have not addressed the 
question presented in this appeal, we believe that the text of 
Section 638 compels reversal. “When ascertaining 
Pennsylvania law, the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court are the authoritative source.” Spence v. ESAB Grp., 
Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). Because the 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, “we 
must predict how it would rule.” Id. (citing Covington v. 
Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
When interpreting Pennsylvania law, we apply its rules of 
statutory interpretation. See 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1921 
(providing guidance for courts interpreting Pennsylvania 
statutes); see also United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 369–
71 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Pennsylvania rules of statutory 
interpretation to construe a statute). Pennsylvania’s General 
Assembly also provided that Section 638 “shall be liberally 
construed to accomplish its purpose.” 40 Pa. Stat. § 638(k).  
 Section 638 is relatively straightforward and its 
application here proceeds in three steps. First, the statute 
prohibits insurance companies from “pay[ing] a claim of a 
named insured for fire damage to a structure located within 
the municipality,” unless the insurance company is furnished 
with an appropriate certificate from the municipal treasurer. 
40 Pa. Stat. § 638(a). Thus, Erie was prohibited from paying a 
claim to Park Restoration (the named insured) for fire damage 
to the Beach Club (the damaged structure) unless Erie was 
furnished with the appropriate certificate.  
 Second, there will be one of two types of certificates 
issued depending on whether delinquent taxes are owed on 
the property where the structure was located. When, as in this 
case, there is a tax delinquency, the municipal treasurer is 
required to issue “a certificate and bill showing the amount of 
delinquent taxes, assessments, penalties and user charges 
against the property as of the date specified in the request.” 
40 Pa. Stat. § 638(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). Here, the 55.33 
acre tax parcel on Conneaut Lake had a tax delinquency of 
$478,260.75.  
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 Finally, upon receipt of the certificate, Erie was 
required to “transfer to the treasurer an amount from the 
insurance proceeds necessary to pay the taxes.” 40 Pa. Stat. 
§ 638(b)(2)(ii).  
As the Bankruptcy Court observed, the statute does not 
“qualify its terms by requiring that the named insured be the 
‘owner’ of the structure destroyed by the fire. Nor does the 
statute limit the imposition of the tax claim against insurance 
proceeds payable to the entity primarily liable for the tax debt 
in question.” Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 543 B.R. at 203. The 
tax claim is “levied against the insured property”—that is, it 
is “in rem in nature and runs with the real property.” Id. 
(internal formatting and quotation marks omitted). So the 
Taxing Authorities’ claim “attache[d] to any fire insurance 
proceeds payable to any named insured as opposed to being 
limited solely to the beneficial interests (if any) of the 
primarily liable taxpayer.” Id. 
Unlike the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court found 
the statute ambiguous. In doing so, the District Court cited 40 
Pa. Stat. § 638(b)(2)(i), which uses the terms “insured 
property owner” and “named insured.” Perceiving that these 
terms were used interchangeably, the District Court 
concluded that “[a] straight-forward reading of the statute 
demonstrates that it is referencing the same party when it 
refers to the ‘named insured’ and the ‘insured property 
owner.’” Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 551 B.R. at 585. 
According to the District Court, the only way to resolve the 
inconsistency was to “assume that the General Assembly 
meant that the ‘named insured’ and ‘the insured property 
owner’ are synonymous” throughout the entire statute. Id. It 
followed, then, that this inconsistency rendered Section 638 
“reasonably susceptible [to] different interpretations.” Id. 
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(quoting Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 
2005)).  
 We need not opine as to whether the District Court is 
correct that the General Assembly used the terms “named 
insured” and “insured property owner” interchangeably for 
purposes of Section 638(b)(2)(i), which applies when a 
property is free from tax delinquency. It suffices to say that 
the subsection upon which the District Court relied has no 
application here, where property taxes undoubtedly were in 
arrears. And the subsection relevant to this case (Section 
638(b)(1)(ii)) refers to “named insured” with nary a mention 
of “insured property owner.”  
“When the words of a statute are clear and free from 
all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the 
pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1921(b). The 
statute’s unambiguous words “are presumed to be the best 
indication of legislative intent.” Reid v. City of Philadelphia, 
957 A.2d 232, 235 (Pa. 2008) (quoting Chanceford Aviation 
Props., L.L.P. v. Chanceford Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 923 
A.2d 1099, 1104 (Pa. 2007)). Because the Bankruptcy Court 
correctly held that the applicable statutory provision is 
unambiguous, we must reverse the District Court’s order in 
that respect. 
B 
 Park Restoration raises two other arguments in support 
of its position that Section 638 applies only to property 
owners. These arguments—that public policy and equity 
compel us to affirm the District Court—cannot vitiate the text 
of the statute.  
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1 
Park Restoration argues that the public policy 
underlying Section 638 was to prevent property owners from 
“burn[ing] their buildings or structures to collect the 
insurance proceeds” by requiring that money “be first used to 
pay delinquent real estate taxes.” Park Rest. Br. 16. From this 
premise, it concludes that this “rationale does not apply where 
the insured does not have a responsibility to pay . . . real 
estate taxes or to repair or secure a building or structure.” Id.  
We have little doubt that the statute’s principal 
purpose is to stop property owners from profiting from arson. 
But that purpose does not compel the conclusion that “named 
insured” does not also apply to insured occupants who have 
no ownership interest. The public policy concern regarding 
misfeasance by property owners applies nearly as forcefully 
to lessees or others who have insured property they don’t 
own. Moreover, Park Restoration’s interpretation could 
incentivize an end run around Section 638 by permitting 
unscrupulous owners to use the corporate form to collect 
insurance proceeds without satisfying their delinquent taxes.  
2 
 At oral argument, counsel for Park Restoration insisted 
that reinstatement of the Bankruptcy Court’s order would 
bestow an inequitable windfall upon the Trustees. In 
response, the Taxing Authorities explained that the Joint Plan 
of Reorganization provides for payment on their first tax lien 
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as follows: (a) net proceeds of sale of six separate lots owned 
by the Trustees; (b) payment of $478,260.75 due from Park 
Restoration’s fire insurance proceeds; and (c) a “safeguard” 
for the prevention of an overpayment to the Taxing 
Authorities. Taxing Authorities Rule 28j Letter dated Jan. 23, 
2017, at 3. In effect, this payment plan means that since the 
Taxing Authorities have won this appeal, it is possible that 
the net proceeds from the sale of these lots will be used to 
satisfy delinquent taxes owed on other parcels or to satisfy 
other claims from the Trustees’ creditors rather than to pay 
the tax debt owed by the Trustees on the parcel where the 
Beach Club was located. Park Restoration Rule 28j Letter 
dated Jan. 23, 2017, at 2–3. While Park Restoration makes a 
plausible case that it might be subject to an inequitable 
distribution of proceeds at a later date, the record on appeal 
neither compels that conclusion nor allows us to make a 
definitive judgment in that regard. Thus, we will rely on the 
Bankruptcy Court to consider those issues in due course and 
we emphasize that nothing in this opinion should be 
construed to preclude Park Restoration from seeking an 
accounting or any other equitable relief in the future.   
C 
  Park Restoration argues here, as it did in the 
Bankruptcy Court, that “allowing the Taxing Authorities to be 
paid . . . from the Insurance Proceeds results in a ‘gratuitous 
confiscation’ of [Park Restoration’s] property without just 
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause(s) found in 
both the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania 
Constitution.” Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 543 B.R. at 204. We 
find this argument tenuous at best. 
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 The Fifth Amendment provides that “private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment 
applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). The 
Pennsylvania Constitution also provides that “private 
property [shall not] be taken or applied to public use, without 
authority of law and without just compensation being first 
made or secured.” Pa. Const. Art. I, § 10. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court follows federal law in Takings Clause cases 
so our analysis under the Fifth Amendment applies equally to 
Pennsylvania’s Constitution. Corman v. NCAA, 74 A.3d 
1149, 1167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).   
To determine whether an unconstitutional taking 
occurred, we ask three questions: (1) was there a taking?; (2) 
was that taking for public use?; and (3) did the claimant 
receive just compensation? Takings may occur either by 
physical appropriation of property or regulatory activity. See 
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015). On 
the one hand, physical appropriation of property is “a per se 
taking, without regard to other factors.” Id. Thus, “[w]hen the 
government physically takes possession of an interest in 
property . . . it has a categorical duty to compensate the 
former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is taken 
constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.” Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002) (citations omitted). Regulatory 
takings require a more detailed analysis, however. Although 
“property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pa. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). There are “at least two 
discrete categories of regulatory action” that violate the Fifth 
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Amendment: “regulations that compel the property owner to 
suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property” and “regulation 
[that] denies all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land.” Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1015 (1992). When determining whether a regulatory taking 
has occurred, the Court may consider the “economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant” and the “character of the 
governmental action.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  
In this appeal, we need not determine whether there 
was an actual or regulatory taking because the party asserting 
the claim must have a “legally cognizable property interest.” 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 428–29 (3d 
Cir. 2004). Here, it is clear that Park Restoration had no 
legally cognizable property interest in the entirety of the 
proceeds from its insurance policy because Section 638 made 
receipt of such proceeds conditional on satisfying the 
delinquent taxes owed on the insured property. The policy 
states that “[Erie] will pay [Park Restoration] unless some 
other person is named in the policy or is legally entitled to 
receive payment,” Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 543 B.R. at 199, 
and that “[t]his policy conforms to the laws of the state in 
which [Park Restoration’s] principal office is located.” Id. at 
205. Section 638 had been enacted by the General Assembly 
and adopted by the required local ordinance long before Park 
Restoration obtained its insurance policy from Erie. Thus, the 
insurance policy incorporated the statute. See Coolspring 
Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 
147–48 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that “pertinent statutory 
provisions of Pennsylvania insurance law are deemed 
incorporated into insurance policies” (quoting Santos v. Ins. 
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Placement Facility, 626 A.2d 1177, 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993))).  
In sum, when Park Restoration insured the Beach 
Club, its rights to any insurance proceeds were subject to the 
claim of the Taxing Authorities. Without a legally cognizable 
property interest, Park Restoration has no cognizable takings 
claim. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 428–
29 (3d Cir. 2004). Park Restoration’s “failure to establish any 
greater entitlement to the proceeds under its policy (and 
Pennsylvania law) is fatal to its assertion that payment of 
Insurance Proceeds to the Taxing Authorities would violate 
the Takings Clause(s) of the U.S. Constitution and the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.” Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 543 
B.R. at 206 (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413). 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and remand for entry of judgment in favor 
of the Taxing Authorities.  
